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This paper investigates the effects of global and sectoral restrictive measures on cross-border FDI 
among 49 advanced and emerging countries. We use a gravity model with panel data from 2010 to 2019 
and the FDI Restrictiveness Index of the OECD that quantifies the level of restriction in FDI. Our 
results suggest that global restrictive measures do not significantly affect cross-border FDI in OECD 
countries, while restrictions in the service sector have negative and significant effects on FDI. 
Moreover, the overall restrictive measures and those in the service sector negatively impact inward FDI 
among OECD and big emerging countries. In addition, restrictions in the services sector impede 
inward FDI in African countries. Interestingly, restrictions in the secondary sector boost FDI between 
advanced and African countries, with larger effects for inward investments in African countries. The 
analysis of disaggregated sectoral restrictive measures shows that restrictions in business and other 
financial services are negatively associated with intra-OECD FDI, while restrictions in the banking 
sector have a significant positive impact on FDI. We also find that restrictions in the manufacturing 
sector have restrictive impacts on inwrad FDI in big emerging countries, and those in the mining, 
quarrying, and oil extraction sector hinder inward FDI in African countries. Reforms to liberalize 
sectoral restrictions by country have positive effects on FDI, but deregulation of the services sector has 
beneficial effects on inward FDI in all countries. 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become more and more important in economic growth
and globalization in the last years. Indeed, FDI can increase productivity and change the
comparative advantage of host countries. The establishment of multinational firms, capital
accumulation, or delocalization can reduce unemployment, income inequality, poverty, im-
prove technology transfer, and increase product variety through innovation (Hale and Xu,
2016; Dritsaki and Stiakakis, 2014). The empirical literature suggests a positive correlation
between FDI and economic growth (Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos, 2015). However, several
factors determine the massive inflow of FDI into a country and its effectiveness in economic
growth (Alfaro et al., 2004; Li and Liu, 2005; Batten and Vo, 2009; Desbordes and Vicard,
2009). A strong macroeconomic framework with competitive and effective policies is necessary
and contributes to attracting more FDI into a country (tax rates, restrictions on financial
transactions, legal framework, economic and political stability, etc.). Indeed, an investment
environment that considers the local institutions, regulations and policies in which companies
operate stimulates economic growth by encouraging firms to invest. In this case, regulation
has an impact on job creation and sustainability (World Bank, 2005). The positive link between
FDI and growth is stronger in open economies with an educated workforce and developed
financial markets (Bodman and Le, 2013). Moreover, some analyses have showed the positive
link between FDI inflows and low economic policy uncertainty (Gulen and Ion, 2015).
Studies showing the relationship between FDI and regulation suggested that the FDI sector is
far less liberalized than trade in goods and services (Ghosh et al., 2012). Although regional,
bilateral, and multilateral trade and investment agreements have reduced formal barriers,
restrictions are still significant in some countries and affect FDI. The regulatory framework
plays a key role in FDI flows. Indeed, regulation has a profound and durable impact on
a firm’s financial choices and is seen as a crucial driver of investment. To encourage FDI,
authorities must reduce the costs, minimize the risks associated with investment, and create
an appropriate climate for the domestic economy. Regulation must be both optimal and
competitive, protecting investors from potential risks, promoting competition among firms
across borders, and protecting consumers from higher prices.
In 2018, inward FDI represented about 2% of GDP in the EU and 1.5% of GDP in all OECD
countries (see Figure 1). But we find that investments dropped by 3 to 1% of GDP between
2016 and 2018, which is contrary to the acceleration of GDP and trade growth. These trends are
more significant in advanced countries than emerging countries (see Figures 2 and 3). In this
year, some 55 economies introduced at least 112 measures affecting foreign investment. Two
thirds of these measures sought to liberalise, promote and facilitate new investment (falling
since 2016). Almost a third of these measures are new restrictions (increasing since 2016)
(UNCTAD, 2019). How can we explain the decline in foreign investment? Is it a consequence
of restrictive or sub-optimal policies? What is the real impact of restrictive measures on
investment? Have restrictions on investment stimulated capital accumulation in the markets?
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Figure 1: Inward FDI flows, % of GDP, 2010-2018











Figure 2: Inward FDI in advanced countries as %
of GDP, 2010-2018
















Figure 3: Inward FDI in emerging countries as % of GDP
2010-2018















This paper examines the effects of global and sectoral restrictive measures on FDI among
49 advanced and emerging countries from 2010 to 2019. The existing empirical literature
on the effects of restrictions on FDI has shown negative impacts of restrictive measures on
FDI (Nicoletti et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2012). Some studies have underlined the restrictive
effects of measures on cross-border M&A in the secondary sector and non-financial services
(Gregori and Nardo, 2021). Others have highlighted the negative effects of these measures
on cross-border M&A in the services sector (Mistura and Roulet, 2019). Mistura and Roulet
(2019) investigate the impacts of restrictions on global inward FDI and cross-border M&A
across 60 advanced and emerging countries from 1997 to 2016, and Gregori and Nardo (2021)
analyze the effects on EU member countries from 2011 to 2018. Few studies have empirically
measured the impact of sectoral restrictive measures on overall inward FDI between advanced
and emerging countries.
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Our paper contributes to the literature about the effects of restrictive measures on FDI in
advanced and emerging countries. However, it is innovative in 3 aspects .
First, similar to Mistura and Roulet (2019), we estimate through an augmented gravity
model the effects of restrictive measures on cross-border FDI in 49 developed and emerging
countries from 2010 to 2019. We use the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index that
captures barriers to FDI entry in 22 economic sectors across 69 countries. The index measures
institutional factors that could influence FDI, such as restrictions on equity or key personnel
for foreign investors, limitations on the establishment of branches, and clauses on profit and
capital repatriation. Moreover Mistura and Roulet (2019) investigate the effects of restrictions
on global FDI across advanced and emerging countries in 2001 to 2012 and on M&A from
2001-2016. our paper provides a more recent analysis of the effects of restrictions on global
FDI among advanced and emerging countries from 2010 to 2019. It considers the latest
international guidelines for compiling foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics.1 Second,
Mistura and Roulet (2019); Gregori and Nardo (2021) study the effects of different types of
restrictive measures on FDI. Our model examines in more details the impact of global and
sectoral restrictive measures on cross-border FDI. We consider FDI restrictions in the primary,
secondary, and tertiary sectors, and further investigate the more disaggregated sectoral effects.
The last contribution relates to the type of country considered. Contrary to Mistura and Roulet
(2019), who analyze the effects of restrictions on FDI between OECD and non-OECD countries,
we examine these effects at three levels: first, a study on FDI between advanced countries
(intra-OECD), then among OECD countries and emerging countries (BRICS and some Latin
American and Asian countries), and finally between OECD countries and middle-income
countries (North African countries and South Africa).2 Indeed, depending on type of economy,
the impacts of sectoral measures are different. OECD countries have a more service-oriented
economy, emerging countries have a manufacturing and primary sector-based economy and
the economy of African countries depends on agriculture and natural resources.
Our results suggest that overall restrictive measures have negative and non-significant effects
on cross-border FDI across OECD countries, while restrictions in the service sector have
negative and significant effects on FDI. Indeed, an increase of 0.05 points in FDI restrictions in
this sector decreases inward FDI by about 17.36%. Moreover, the overall restrictive measures
and those in the service sector have negative and significant effects on inward FDI among
OECD and emerging countries. An increase of 0.05 points is associated with a decrease in
inward FDI respectively by 14.43% for global measures and 31.31% for those in services.
In addition, restrictions in the services sector hamper bilateral FDI between OECD and
African countries, the effects being more pronounced for African countries. Interestingly,
restrictive measures in the secondary sector stimulate FDI between advanced and African
countries. The effects are significantly negative for OECD countries, so we can conclude that
restrictions in this sector boost inward FDI in African countries. The analysis of disaggregated
sectoral restrictive measures shows that restrictions in business and other financial services
are negatively associated with intra-OECD FDI and restrictive measures in the banking sector
have a positive and significant impact on intra-OECD FDI. A rise of 0.05 points in restrictions
in the banking sector is associated with an increase in inward FDI by 28.30% on average. The
1In 2014, many countries implemented the latest international guidelines for compiling foreign direct investment
(FDI) statistics (OECD, 2015).
2The countries with FDI restrictive measures data available in our sample are North African countries and South
Africa.
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restrictive measures in the manufacturing sector have restrictive impacts on inward FDI in
big emerging countries, most pronounced in the BRICS countries, and those in the mining,
quarrying, and oil extraction sector are barriers to inward FDI in African countries. Reforms
to liberalize sectoral restrictions by country have positive effects on FDI, but deregulation of
the services sector has beneficial effects on inward FDI in all countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section documents recent
literature on the effects of FDI regulation on investment. In the second part, we describe our
econometric model with data, sources, and the type of regression used. The third section
presents and discusses the results. The last section uses the results of this study to perform
policy simulation.
II. Literature Review
Empirical studies that examine the impact of restrictive measures on FDI use two main indices.
Some authors study the effects of restrictions on FDI using the FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness
Index of OECD and others !the indexes of capital account restrictions based on IMF’s AREAER
database.3
Authors such as Nicoletti et al (2003), based on the original version of the index created by
Golub (2003)4 and the OECD’s PMR5, explore the effects of FDI restrictions and other policies
on foreign direct investment in a panel of 28 OECD countries between 1980 and 2000. The
paper uses a gravity model to control bilateral outward FDI flows and a dynamic panel model
to explain total multilateral inward FDI stocks. Their results suggest that FDI restrictions
could reduce bilateral outward FDI stocks by between 10% and 80% on average, depending on
the type of restriction. Inward FDI stocks are also impacted by FDI restrictions, but the results
should be treated carefully due to the lack of variability of restrictions across OECD member
countries. The analysis of Ghosh et al (2012) similar to the previous one shows the impact of
restrictions on inward FDI stocks using panel data (1981-2004) for 23 OECD countries. Based
on the updated of Koyama and Golub (2006) index and a gravity model, they find significant
negative effects of restrictions on inward FDI stocks. To determine the short- and long-run
effects of the restrictions, they use an autoregressive distributed lag model. Their results show
that the short-run elasticity estimated was between 0.06 and -0.14, and the long-run elasticity
between -0.64 and -1.49.
The analysis of Ahrend and Goujard (2012) indicates that FDI restrictions may contribute to
greater risks of financial crisis. Indeed, higher restrictions in OECD countries, measured by
OECD indexes, and anti-competitive product market regulation have contributed to reduced
financial stability. That is due to a rise of countries’ debt over FDI or capital investment. By
contrast, more stringent capital regulations for banks and more openness to foreign bank
entry have reduced the vulnerability to financial contagion. Fournier (2015) examines the
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1998 to 2013, including FDI restrictions.
Using gravity models and the recent version of the OECD FDI restrictiveness index, he finds a
3Database on the exchange rates and trade regimes of all members of the International Monetary Fund (currently
189 countries) and three territories (Aruba, Hong Kong SAR, and Curaa̧o and Sint Maarten - formerly the Netherlands
Antilles).
4The first to construct the aggregate index of FDI restrictions.
5Product Market Regulation index.
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significant negative impact of restrictions on FDI stocks after controlling for various political
and structural determinants of bilateral FDI.
Recent studies examining the impacts of restrictive measures on FDI through the OECD FDI
Regulatory Restrictiveness Index are those by Mistura and Roulet (2019) and Gregori and
Nardo (2021). They differ from those mentioned above because they examine the effects
of restrictions on aggregate FDI, sectoral FDI, and M&A. They also examine the impact
of different types of restrictions such as foreign equity limitations, screening or approval
mechanisms, restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel and operational
restrictions. Mistura and Roulet (2019) find that reforms liberalising FDI restrictions by about
10 percent could increase bilateral FDI in stocks by 2.1 percent on average.The effects are
greater for FDI in the services sector, but also in manufacturing sectors which are typically
open to FDI. The effect of reducing foreign equity limitations is the strongest, and foreign
investment screening policies significantly curb FDI, but to a much lower extent. Gregori and
Nardo (2021) show that the presence of formal screening procedures does not negatively affect
cross-border investment on average. Other restrictive policies, such as licensing requirements,
quantitative limitations, restrictions to the market access and activity of foreign companies
limit M&A flows. This is particularly relevant in the manufacturing and non-financial services
industries, where M&A flows are negatively affected by restrictions on foreign personnel
being employed in key positions, and restrictions on the establishment of branch offices, land
acquisition, or profit and capital repatriations. Their results are also in line to the literature
about the effects of regulation on trade in services. Indeed Van der Marel and Shepherd’s
(2013) examine the relationship between trade in services and regulation. They find a negative
relationship between regulatory restrictiveness and trade flows, with the effects varying across
sectors. Nordås and Rouzet (2017) confirm this result. In their gravity model relating trade in
services with regulatory restrictions, tighter restrictions decrease both trade and investment,
with the exports of services more impacted than imports.
Contrary to the above studies, Binici, Hutchison and Schindler (2009) apply an index of capital
restrictions based on IMF’s AREAER information, by asset class and covering 74 countries
over the period 1995-2005. They study the effects of FDI and equity portfolio investment
restrictions on total inward and outward FDI and equity portfolio investment. The results
suggest that restrictions control capital outflows, not inflows. The study of Arbatli (2011)
similar to the previous one, uses capital account restriction indices based on IMF’s AREAER
database. Through a binary index of FDI restrictions, he investigates the determinants of FDI
flows into emerging economies. The author creates two binary indicators of FDI restrictions:
one that assesses the existence of any restrictions on FDI inflows; and one that captures
restrictions on the liquidation of direct investment. He uses a dynamic panel model approach
to model FDI flows and data for 46 countries over 20 years. The results suggest that FDI
capital restrictions have a significant negative effect on inward FDI, but no significant effect
was found for restrictions on the liquidation of investment.
III. Theoretical Gravity Model for FDI
Gravity model, is increasingly used when investigating determinants of FDI flows.6 Head
and Ries (2008) provide theoretical micro-foundations for a gravitational model of FDI and
6Wei (2000) or Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007).
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motivate its application for modelling bilateral FDI as well as trade flows.
The framework used in this paper is based on recent advances in the literature on gravitational
models (see Yotov et al., 2016). In particular, we apply the gravity modeling approach for FDI
developed by Anderson et al (2016, 2017). Indeed, their model shows how trade and FDI are
linked and how they respond to natural or man-made barriers to trade and investment.
In particular, Anderson et al (2016, 2017) model focuses on the interpretation of FDI based on
technological capital or knowledge capital. A given stock of technological capital (patents,
plans, management skills, etc.) can be used simultaneously in more than one country. The
value of knowledge capital increases when it can be "leased" to other countries as FDI. Since
knowledge capital flows are largely intangible and therefore difficult to measure, bilateral FDI
stock will be used as a proxy indicator of knowledge capital flows between two countries.
FDI from country i to country j is as follows: FDIstockij . It is positively influenced by the size
of source country (Ei), as large economies tend to invest more in technological capital. The
stock of bilateral FDI is also positively influenced by the size of destination country (Yj), as
large economies can in principle absorb more foreign technology. If the size of the aggregate
stock of technological capital in country i is denoted by Mi, the ratio
Yi
Mi
can be considered as
a gross measure of the potential absorptive capacity of country j for FDI-related technological
capital from country i. FDI flows are impeded by obstacles or frictions. For FDI, the relative
openness of country j to foreign technologies can be represented by ij, which has values from
0 to 1. If wij = 1, country j is fully open to the entry of technological capital from country i,
while in the case of wij = 0, no technological capital from country i is allowed. All these factors








Wth Ei measures the size of country i as a total expenditure, including expenditures for
the development of technological capital; Yj is a measure of the size of host country j. The
parameter η is the elasticity of FDI revenue flows with respect to the measure of openness.
More openness in country j will lead to more frequent use of the technology stock, which
will lead to an increase of FDI revenues. The other elements of equation (1) come from the
structural gravity system for trade, in which the FDI determinants are integrated. α groups
a set of fixed parameters from the theoretical model.8 Finally, Pi is the inward multilateral
resistance term of the gravity trade model. They aggregate the bilateral trade costs of country














With tji represents the bilateral trade-cost frictions (bilateral distance, having different lan-
guages, common border..) that increase bilateral trade cost. Y = ∑ Yj is world production or
world GDP, used to normalize the size of destination country (Yj), and σ is the elasticity of
substitution from CES functions used to aggregate multilateral resistance (MR) terms.9
7Time indices are omitted in this representation.
8These include parameters such as the depreciation rate, the utility function discount factor and other parameters
that are used in the underlying theoretical model (see Anderson et al., 2016, 2017).
9With σ > 1, the elasticity of substitution shows that all countries have a preference for a variety of products and
technological capital by origin country.
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World trade is a fully integrated system, equation (2) also contains the term Πj, which repre-
sents the outward multilateral trade resistances of country j. It aggregates the bilateral trade














Equation (3) shows that if trade costs increase in host country j, domestic prices rise and thus
reduce the country’s real potential to absorb foreign technological capital.
The author has highlighted the gravity estimation of bilateral FDI remains Bénassy-Quéré et
al. (2005). The latter study the impacts of FDI determinants on horizontal FDI. In the model,
bilateral FDI stocks depend on both economies’ GDP, the determinants of supply and demand,
and the distance between capital. However, recent theoretical developments have provided
other foundations for the application of a gravity model to other FDI models (Kleinert and
Toubal, 2010; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Head and Ries, 2008; De Sousa et al., 2012; Heid
and Larch, 2016 and Nordås and Rouzet, 2017).10 Bergstrand and Egger (2007) implement
a gravity model of FDI by including several aspects of FDI (foreign direct investment (FDI),
foreign affiliate sales (FAS) and multinational companies (MNEs). However, Head and Ries
(2008) develop a gravity model of FDI by considering the M&A process, in which the holding
company tries to control the assets abroad.
IV. Model and Estimation Issues
In our empirical analysis, we examine the impacts of restrictions on FDI stocks between OECD
and emerging countries. Using the model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003); Anderson et
al (2016, 2017), our baseline regression equation is the following:
FDIij,t = exp[β0 + β1Ln(FDIij,t−1) + β2FDI RIsj,t−1 + β3tij,t−1+
β4Ln(GDPi,t−1) + β5Ln(GDPj,t−1) + β6Xj,t−1 + αi + φj + γt + εij,t]
(4)
With FDIij,t represents FDI stocks from country i (the reporting or source country) to country
j (the partner or host country) in period t (2010-2019)= FDIij,tGDPde f lator(ij,t) . FDI are calculated by
dividing FDI stocks (in U.S. dollars) by the average of the source and host country GDP
deflators to remove inflation. FDIij,t−1 is one-year lagged dependent variable (Egger and
Merlo, 2007).11 Following Mistura and Roulet (2019), all explanatory variables are lagged
by one year to reduce potential endogeneity issues. FDI RIsj,t−1 is our interest variable
(FDI Regulatory Index), i.e. the restrictive measures on FDI implemented in the destination
country j at the time t-1 in the sector s (s= primary, secondary and tertiary sectors). It is
measured by the OECD FDI restrictiveness index. tij,t−1 includes time-invariant bilateral
control variables, i.e. bilateral distance, common language, common border, colonial links
10The studies combine both horizontal and vertical FDI.
11They argue that ignoring the dynamic nature of FDI could lead to an overestimation of the effect of bilateral
factors.
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(Blonigen and Piger, 2014)12 and time varying variables such as regional trade agreements
(RTA), bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and human capital dissimilarity (HCDij,t). According
to Ethier and Markusen (1996), the difference in factor endowments can affect inward FDI.13
We include standard gravity variables, specifically the GDP of both the origin country and the
destination country. Xjt covers destination country specific characteristics such as regulatory
quality (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007) and FDI determinants in destination country such as
trade openess 14, productivity, labour freedom index15, tax burden (Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh,
Ramalho, and Shleifer, 2010).16 αi and φj represent source-host country fixed effect (dummy
variables that control the inward and outward multilateral resistance terms). γt is a time fixed
effect (capturing the global macroeconomic cycle) and εijt is a error term. Standard errors are
clustered by country pairs to control for potential heteroskedasticity and to limit the potential
effect of persistence over time of FDI stock levels in each pair of countries, see Fournier (2015).
β2 is the coefficient of interest; according to the litterature it is negative (Ghosh et al., 2012;
Fournier, 2015; Mistura and Roulet, 2019).
Our dependent variable takes a value of zero and an estimation using OLS leads to a bias
(zero FDI is associated with high bilateral fixed costs). To avoid biased estimation results,
we use the Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimator (PPML) suggested by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006). The PPML is used in our case in order to deal with the constraints of zero
trade between States, and also estimates the non-linear shape of the gravity model in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. However, an important assumption of the PPML estimator
is equidispersion, which means that the conditional variance of the dependent variable and




[Xp − exp(Zpβ)] = 0 (5)
Where p is the country pair, Xp is unilateral trade (i.e. exports or imports) between country
pairs in non-logarithmic levels and Zp is the complete vector of the gravity equation as defined
above.
We include in the estimation fixed effects by origin country to control for unobservable
multilateral resistance terms (Olivero and Yotov, 2012).17
V. Data Description
To analyse the effects of restrictive measures on FDI stocks between OECD and emerging
countries, we use panel data across 49 countries from 2010 to 2019. Indeed, we consider OECD
12They identify as main enabling factors for inward FDI the traditional gravity variables such as cultural distance,
difference in labor endowment, and the presence of trade agreements.
13Golub et al., 2003 define human capital dissimilarity as the difference in absolute value between the human
capital index in the destination country and that in the source country HCDij,t =| (ln(educationjt − ln(educationit) |.
14Chakrabarti (2001) finds that a country’s degree of openness to international trade is a relevant determinant of
the FDI decision, because most investment projects concern the tradable sector.
15Nordin et al. (2019).
16They estimate, using cross-sectional survey data for 85 developed and developing countries, that corporate taxes
always have a negative and significant effect on FDI inflows.
17We also estimated the model using destination country’s dummies, but the model presents convergence issues
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011).
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countries because inward and outward FDI account for a large share of GDP and we include
emerging countries due to the high level of restrictions in FDI (see figure 4). Annual data
from 2010-2019 to explain the decline in inward FDI since 2016, and to consider the new FDI
statistics introduced in 2014. Our dependant variable is aggregate bilateral FDI stock. The
data are collected on OECD Foreign Direct Investment Statistics.18 The data cover a range of
advanced and emerging countries in terms of origin and destination. However, we use the
latest version set up by the OECD.19 This database highlights bilateral FDI between OECD
member and non-member countries and runs from 2005 to 2019. It also highlights sectoral FDI
(primary, manufacturing and service sectors).20 Missing data (or non-reported, suppressed)
and negative FDI are replaced by 0 in our case, because negative values are interpreted as
disinvestment and to have a balanced panel (Kox and Rojas, 2019).
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Source: OECD database
Our interest variable captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI. We use FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index of OECD. Indeed, this variable measures the restrictiveness of the
policies implemented in the FDI sector in 70 countries (36 OECD countries and 34 non-OECD
countries). It gauges the restrictiveness of a country’s FDI rules by looking at the four main
types of restrictions on FDI:
• Foreign equity limitations.
• Screening or approval mechanisms.
• Restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel.
• Operational restrictions, e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital repatriation or on
land ownership.
18https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=64194.
19Benchmark Definition 4th Edition (BMD4).
20Sector-specific FDI data are not bilateral so the sectoral analysis will be conducted with the sectoral FDI
restriction index.
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The restrictions are also quantified in three sectors of activity: primary, secondary and
tertiary. Restrictions are evaluated on a 0 (open) to 1 (closed) scale. Data are available for 1997,
2003 and 2006 and uninterrupted annual data for the period 2010-2019. Data collected from
OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index database.
In addition, bilateral resistance variables such as the bilateral distance between the two
capitals and binary variables (common border, language and colonial links) come from
CEPII (Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’ Informations Internationales) database. Binary
variables such as regional trade agreements are obtained from the WTO (Regional Trade
Agreements Information System, RTA-IS) and information on the signing and ratification of
bilateral investment treaties is taken from on UNCTAD’s International Investment Agreements
database.
We consider the specific characteristics of the destination country that affect inward FDI
such as regulatory quality (data available on Worldwide Governance Indicators). It refers
to perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. The indicator is
estimated yearly at the country level, in units of a standard normal distribution, ranging from
approximately -2.5 to 2.5.
FDI determinants in destination countries such as tax burden and labour freedom index
are collected on The Heritage Foundation database.21 Tax burden is a composite measure
that reflects marginal tax rates on both personal and corporate income and the overall level
of taxation (including direct and indirect taxes) imposed by all levels of government as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The labor freedom component is a quantitative
measure that considers various aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s
labor market, including regulations concerning minimum wages, laws inhibiting layofs,
severance requirements, and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked,
plus the labor force participation rate as an indicative measure of employment opportunities
in the labor market. These two indices are graded on a scale of 0 (less flexible) to 100 (more
open or flexible). Productivity are collected on OECD database.22 Human capital index in
Penn World Table database of Groningen Growth and Development Centre.23 Trade openness,
GDP of exporting and importing countries are extracted from the World Bank database (World
Development Indicators)
VI. FDI Gravity Results and Discussion
This section presents and analyzes the empirical results. We estimate the effects of restrictive
measures on FDI stocks between OECD and emerging countries from 2010 to 2019. Tables
2, 3 and 4 present the baseline gravity model results for cross-border FDI using the OECD
FDI restrictiveness index. Table 2 presents the results of restrictions on bilateral FDI among
advanced countries (intra-OECD) and tables 3 and 4 respectively the results on cross-border
FDI among advanced and big emerging countries and between OECD and middle-income
21https://www.heritage.org/index.
22It measured by GDP per hour worked (U.S dollars).
23This index refers to the number of years of schooling and return on education.
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emerging countries (African).24 In order to determine whether the effects of FDI restrictions
can be expected to differ for developed and developing economies, we include a dummy
variable equals 1 if the destination country is an OECD member in year t and an interaction
term with the variable of interest capturing their level of FDI restrictiveness (results presented
in Tables 3 and 4). We confirmed the validity of our results using a series of robustness
tests presented in Tables 5 to 11. We apply the PPML estimator to control for the zero FDI
and heteroskedasticity issues, we also include country fixed effects to control for structural
multilateral resistance. Therefore, in order to better capture multilateral resistance and produce
unbiased estimates, we include country and time fixed effects separately.
i. Baseline results
In terms of variables of main interest - the FDI restrictiveness indices - we find that global FDI
restrictions have a negative and non-significant effect on intra-OECD FDI because the sectoral
FDI regulation index is larger than the global index (see Figure 5). Moreover, these restrictions
represent a barrier to cross-border FDI among OECD countries and the big emerging countries.
The introduction of reforms leading to a 0.05 point reduction in level of FDI restrictiveness
could increase bilateral FDI inward stocks by around 17.17% on average (column 4 of Table
3).25 The interaction between our dummy variable and the restrictive measures does not have
a significant effect on FDI. The combined negative and significant effect of global restrictive
measures and non-significant effect of our interaction term suggests that the negative effects
of restrictions on FDI tend to be more accentuated for emerging economies.26 This result
confirms the findings of Mistura and Roulet (2019). Further, global restrictive measures do
not affect cross-border FDI between OECD and African countries (Table 4).27
The sectoral analysis of FDI restrictive measures shows significant negative effects of restric-
tions in the services sector on intra-OECD FDI. The effect of a 0.05 point reduction in FDI
restrictions in services is associated with a 17.36 % increase in global FDI (column 4 of table
2). The reason is that services are the largest sector for inward investment in the OECD and
also the most restrictive compared to other sectors, which explains the non-significant results
(see Table 1 and figure 5). Indeed, the manufacturing sector, excluding defense and military
goods, is the most open sector where countries generally allow foreign investment. In the
primary sector, the location-specific and licensing-heavy nature of some of such investments
(e.g., extractive industries) may offer relatively few alternatives for foreign investors. The
existence of numerous taxes and royalties where economic rents are potentially high, as in the
extractive industries, to capture a part of such rents for their nationals limits investment in this
sector (Mistura and Roulet, 2019). The analysis on FDI across advanced and large emerging
countries suggests significant negative effects of restrictive measures in the services sector. A
reduction in service sector restrictions by 0.05 points leads to an increase in global inward FDI
by 31.31% on average, and these effects are greater for emerging countries.
Insert Table 1 here.
24The estimated coefficients from regressions pooling wealthy and poor economies may fail to capture the true
relationship between FDI and the explanatory variable of interest (Blonigen and Wang’s, 2004).
25The percentage change in inward FDI from a 0.05 point reduction in the FDI restrictiveness index is calculated
as follows: [exp(-0.05*coefficient)-1]*100.
26The reason is that global and sectoral restrictions, especially in services, are very high in emerging countries.
27We have a limited sample of African countries, which could explain these results.
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Figure 5: OECD and Emerging countries FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index in 2019
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
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mean of Primary mean of Manufacturing
mean of Tertiary mean of TotalFDIIndex
Source: OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index databasee
Moreover, restrictions in the services sector hamper bilateral FDI between OECD and
African countries, and as before the effects are more pronounced for African countries
(column 8 of table 4). Interestingly, restrictive measures in the secondary sector boost FDI
between OECD and African countries. Our interaction term shows significant negative effects
of these measures for OECD countries and the combined effects show significant positive
effects of restrictions in the manufacturing sector for African countries. The negative effects
of restrictive measures in the secondary sector on FDI between OECD countries refers to the
existing literature on the effects of restrictions in services on the performance of manufacturing
firms (Ariu et al., 2019; Ariu et al., 2020; Amara, 2021). Indeed, restrictions on FDI in services
impact the productivity of manufacturing firms (increased costs of sourcing services) as they
increasingly use services as an important input of manufacturing value added. The positive
effect of restrictions in the manufacturing sector for African countries can be explained by the
fact that the index in this sector measures FDI restrictions in the food, chemical, metal, and
electronics industries. Contrary to OECD countries where these sectors are developed with
more competition, they are still nascent in North and South Africa with lower competition. An
increase in restrictions in this sector leads to an increase in economic rents from FDI (Rouzet
and Spinelli, 2016). One of our robustness tests incorporates restrictions in the mining and
natural resources sector (a developed industry in Africa), and we find negative effects on FDI
in Africa.
The negative impacts of restrictive measures in FDI are due to high entry costs in the different
sectors. In addition to acting as a barrier to entry, this result may also underscore a potential
signaling effect of restrictions about the difficulties in doing business as a foreign investor,
including outside of the restricted sectors. Services are the sectors that receive the most FDI
and thus are the most affected by these restrictions.
Insert Table 2 here.
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Insert Table 3 here.
Insert Table 4 here.
In the different specifications, we also find the following effects: the standard gravity
model variables such as distance, common language and colonial links have the expected signs
and magnitudes and are statistically significant. Indeed, distance has negative and significant
effects on cross-border FDI inflows among advanced and emerging countries as in the theory
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Basile et al., 2008). Binary variables such as common language and
colonial links have positive and more significant effects on FDI between OECD and emerging
countries. Moreover, the common border has negative and significant impacts on FDI inflows,
which is contrary to the theory. This negative and significant sign is due to the substitutability
between trade and FDI, especially between countries that share the same border (Gregori
and Nardo, 2021). This can be explained by the European Monetary Union (Brouwer et
al., 2008, Martínez-San Román et al., 2016) and the single currency (Camarero et al., 2018;
Alfieri, 2020). Regional trade agreements (RTA) have significant negative effects on FDI in
advanced countries, while there are significant positive impacts on cross-border FDI among
advanced and emerging countries. The negative effect of trade agreements suggests that
being a partner in a trade agreement tends to discourage FDI between origin and destination
countries, because a trade agreement facilitates access to the destination country’s market
through other channels, such as exports or greenfield investments (Mistura and Roulet, 2019).
Bilateral investment treaties (BIT) have negative and significant effects on cross-border FDI,
more meaningful effects on FDI across OECD and emerging countries. The BIT has different
characteristics than the RTA, it protects the investor against risks in the market receiving
the FDI. It therefore establishes transparency on the host country (Bergstrand and Egger,
2013). These agreements among advanced countries and emerging or developing countries
(North-South investment) have much greater effects than North-North agreements (Kox and
Rojas, 2019). BITs affect negatively FDI inflows when the political risk in a country is high
whereas the opposite occurs when the risk level is low (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 2005).28
If we consider the determinants and explanatory factors of FDI, the regulatory quality
variable is positively related to cross-border FDI, highlighting the proactive role that public
administration can exert to stimulate foreign investment (Gregori and Nardo, 2021). Trade
openness attracts investment because of a complementarity between FDI and trade (Belke
and Clemens, 2018). The dynamism of the destination economy has positive and significant
impacts on FDI. These results confirm that the size of the destination country’s market boosts
cross-border investments by creating additional market shares, economies of scale, or reducing
production costs for foreign investors (Eicher et al., 2012). Likewise, the dynamism of investing
country is positively related to cross-border flows (Gregori and Nardo, 2021). The productivity
measured by the GDP per hour employed is positively associated with FDI. Like the GDP
of the destination country, productivity in the destination economy creates economies of
scale and reduces production costs, which attracts cross-border FDI. The difference in relative
human capital endowment is significant with a negative impact29, suggesting possibly the
28This confirms the negative and more significant effects on cross-border FDI among advanced and emerging
countries (where the political risk is higher).
29The effect is more significant on FDI among advanced and emerging countries.
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predominance of horizontal FDI and M&A investments (Mistura and Roulet, 2019). As Gregori
and Nardo, 2021, the tax indicator does not have a significant effect on FDI flows, explained
by the predominance of market factors over institutional aspects in driving cross-border
investments (Gherghina, Simionescu and Hudea, 2019). Labour market flexibility attracts
cross-border FDI. Indeed, labor market standards and regulations or any limitation placed
on employment lead to labor market rigidity, which imposes costs on firms (Nordin et al.,
2019).30
ii. Robustness check
In this section, we performed several robustness tests to confirm our baseline results. First,
we split our sample in two periods (2010-2014) and (2015-2019) and examine the different
effects of restrictive measures on FDI between advanced and emerging countries. This test
highlights two trends: the effects of the policy on international guidelines for the compilation
of foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics implemented in many countries in 2014 and the
impacts of the 2008-2009 financial crisis that led to a stagnation of FDI.31 We consider the
different trends between 2010-2014 (effect of the crisis) and 2015-2019 (effect of the new policy
for the compilation of FDI statistics). The results are presented in Table 5 and show more
significant effects in the period 2015 to 2019 and confirm our results found above; however,
during this period, global restrictions have negative and significant effects on intra-OECD FDI
and on FDI between OECD countries and large emerging economies. Restrictive measures in
the post-crisis period had a greater impact on FDI between OECD countries and emerging
markets.
Insert Table 5 here.
The second test examines the effects of restrictive measures on FDI between advanced and
BRICS countries32 considered as large emerging countries and between OECD and emerging
countries excluding BRICS. This test shows whether the effects are different among emerging
countries. The results reported in table 6 show that restrictions have negative and more
significant impacts on BRICS than other emerging countries and confirm that restrictions in
the service sector have a significantly negative impact on cross-border FDI.
Insert Table 6 here.
OECD inward and outward FDI in the services sector is the largest in comparison to the
other two sectors (accounts for almost 60% of total FDI, see table 1) and considering table 7,
FDI in the financial sector is the biggest of the cross-border FDI in services. The third test
looks at the effects of restrictions in the disaggregated financial services sector on intra-OECD
FDI. Table 8 presents the results and shows that restrictions in business and other financial
services are negatively associated with cross-border FDI (negative and significant results).
However, FDI restrictions in the insurance sector have no significant effect and those in the
30Their study argues that the growth-effect of FDI is possibly influenced by the flexibility of the labor market in
the host country.
31Gregori and Nardo (2021) observed a stagnation of inward M&As in EU countries during 2011-14.
32Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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banking sector have a positive and significant impact on intra-OECD FDI, explained by the
profit margin of FDI in this sector as a result of restrictions (Rouzet and Spinelli, 2016).33 A
rise of 0.05 points in restrictions in the banking sector is associated with an increase in inward
FDI by 28.30% on average.
Insert Table 8 here.
The two tests below estimate the effects of restrictive measures on FDI between OECD and
emerging countries by type of economy. The big emerging countries have economies more
oriented to the manufacturing and agricultural sectors than the North and South African
countries where the main economic activity is agriculture and natural resources (table 9). In
the first part, we study the effects of restrictions in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors
on FDI between OECD countries and large emerging economies (results reported in table
10) and the second the effects of restrictions in the agricultural and natural resources sectors
(mining, oil and gas, etc.) on FDI among OECD and African countries (table 11).
Insert Table 10 here.
Insert Table 11 here.
The results suggest that FDI restrictions in the manufacturing sector have significant
negative effects on FDI between advanced and emerging countries, the effect being more
pronounced if the destination country is an emerging country. In addition, restrictive measures
in the mining, quarrying, and oil extraction sector have significant negative effects on FDI
between advanced and African countries, with higher effects for African countries.
The last test examines the effects of restrictive measures on FDI across advanced and all
emerging economies including Africa. North and South African countries are considered
upper-middle-income countries according to the World Bank classification. The results
presented in table 12 show significant negative impacts on FDI restrictions in the services
sector. In addition, measures in the secondary sector are positively associated with inward
FDI (significant but low magnitude). The positive impact is mainly due to restrictions in the
secondary sector of African countries, as highlighted in our baseline results.
Insert Table 12 here.
These results underscore the implementation by the governments of attractive sectoral
regulation of FDI. The effects of FDI vary according to the type of economy, but unanimously,
liberalization of the services sector has more beneficial effects on inward FDI in all countries
in order to boost the performance of manufacturing industries. The big emerging countries in
addition to the services sector should deregulate the manufacturing sector which plays a vital
role in economic activity, and for African countries, reforms to liberalize the natural resources
sector would further boost inward investment. Governments also need to regulate FDI taking
into account the restrictions of other countries, because regulations will affect FDI differently
depending on the destination country.
33They showed that a high level of restrictiveness in the banking sector is associated with less competition in the
market, so that incumbent financial institutions raise interest rates to increase their profit margins.
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VII. Conclusion
This paper, which investigates the effects of restrictive measures on FDI, contributes to the
literature on the impact of restrictions on FDI, but differs from recent studies because it
examines the sectoral effects of FDI restrictions on cross-border FDI between advanced and
emerging countries.
Using a gravity model we examined the effects of global and sectoral restrictive measures
on FDI among OECD countries, between advanced and large emerging countries and finally
between advanced and African countries from 2010 to 2019. Our results suggested that
global restrictive measures have non-significant negative effects on cross-border FDI between
OECD countries, while restrictions on FDI in the services sector are negatively associated
with inward FDI. In addition, both overall and service sector restrictions have negative and
significant effects on inward FDI among OECD and emerging market countries. In addition,
restrictions in the services sector hamper bilateral FDI between OECD and African countries,
the effects being more pronounced for African countries. Interestingly, restrictive measures in
the manufacturing sector stimulate FDI between advanced and African countries. The effects
are significantly negative for OECD countries, so we can conclude that restrictions in this
sector stimulate inward FDI in African countries.
The results are robust to the baseline results. Several tests are performed. First, we estimated
the effects of global and sectoral restrictions between advanced and emerging countries in the
period 2010 to 2014 and 2015 to 2019. The results confirmed our baseline results and showed
more significant effects in the period 2015 to 2019. The second test examined the impacts of
restrictive measures on the BRICS and on emerging countries excluding the BRICS, the results
are more significant on the BRICS than on other emerging countries. The third test evaluated
the effects of disaggregated restrictions on intra-OECD FDI, especially in financial services.
The results suggested that restrictions in business and other financial services are negatively
associated with cross-border FDI. However, restrictions on FDI in the insurance sector have no
significant effect and those in the banking sector have a positive and significant impact on
intra-OECD FDI. The last two tests showed that restrictive measures in the manufacturing
sector have restrictive impacts on inward FDI in emerging economies, particularly in the
BRICS, and that restrictions in the mining, quarrying, and oil extraction sector are an obstacle
to inward FDI in African countries.
We could improve our study by considering financial FDI such as M&A. However, there are
some important limitations, mainly related to the data. First, FDI restrictions have some
limitations, notably that they are time-invariant for some sectors. Second, it would be really
interesting to also examine the effects of these restrictive measures on domestic investment in
future research.
This paper highlighted the detrimental impact of restrictive measures on cross-border FDI.
It showed the negative impacts of sectoral restrictions depending on the type of economy
receiving the FDI. From this study, we conclude that the drop of inward FDI in OECD countries
since 2016 is due to a rise of restrictive and protectionist policies in order to protect local firms.
It is also the result of Donald Trump’s tax cuts since 2017. This measure led to repatriation of
profits into United States. This decrease is probably due to the trade war between China and
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Table 1: OECD outward and inward FDI stocks by sector (% of total FDI) 34
Years 2016 2017 2018 2019
Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward Inward Outward
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing and mining 0.73 0.29 0.82 0.3 0.79 1.1 1.08 2.14
Manufacturing sector 23.04 21.99 23.98 22.71 22.87 23.44 23.07 20.6
Service sector 63.48 60.46 62.44 61.75 64.22 61.23 62.47 62.38
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD FDI data
34The partner country is the world.
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FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 -0.9684 -0.7067 -1.5775 -1.4577
(1.1535) (1.1299) (1.2897) (1.2565)
FDI RI Primaryj,t−1 1.0655 1.1570 1.1757∗ 1.0851
(0.8421) (0.7943) (0.6918) (0.6599)
FDI RI Secondaryj,t−1 0.9040 1.1388 0.4176 0.5394
(1.2758) (1.2120) (1.6173) (1.5702)
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t−1 -2.6733∗ -2.6431∗ -3.3697∗∗ -3.2017∗∗
(1.4024) (1.3860) (1.5783) (1.5114)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.3921∗∗∗ 1.4414∗∗∗ 0.6660∗∗∗ 0.7409∗∗∗ 1.3806∗∗∗ 1.4331∗∗∗ 0.6574∗∗∗ 0.7309∗∗∗
(0.0608) (0.0634) (0.0627) (0.0642) (0.0593) (0.0604) (0.0620) (0.0641)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -0.7392∗∗∗ -0.6847∗∗∗ -0.7486∗∗∗ -0.6828∗∗∗ -0.7635∗∗∗ -0.7065∗∗∗ -0.7681∗∗∗ -0.7002∗∗∗
(0.1486) (0.1264) (0.1110) (0.1065) (0.1595) (0.1342) (0.1275) (0.1214)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.2457∗∗ -0.2539∗∗ -0.2492∗∗ -0.2408∗∗ -0.2294∗ -0.2344∗∗ -0.2210∗∗ -0.2150∗∗
(0.1183) (0.1046) (0.1138) (0.1096) (0.1253) (0.1103) (0.1093) (0.1056)
Common langij,t−1 0.1162 0.0851 0.1324 0.1198 0.1096 0.0790 0.1419 0.1291
(0.1175) (0.1110) (0.1060) (0.1004) (0.1208) (0.1119) (0.1059) (0.1005)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.0798 0.0705 0.2398∗∗ 0.2322∗∗ 0.0469 0.0365 0.1867 0.1835
(0.1753) (0.1621) (0.1181) (0.1159) (0.1795) (0.1641) (0.1158) (0.1137)
RTAij,t−1 -0.4967∗∗∗ -0.4430∗∗∗ 0.1999 0.2427∗∗ -0.5057∗∗∗ -0.4543∗∗∗ 0.2070 0.2499∗
(0.1446) (0.1438) (0.1238) (0.1136) (0.1519) (0.1526) (0.1401) (0.1286)
BITij,t−1 -0.2125∗ -0.1991∗ -0.2181 -0.1987 -0.2631∗∗ -0.2516∗∗ -0.3515∗∗ -0.3218∗∗
(0.1151) (0.1092) (0.1500) (0.1425) (0.1091) (0.1039) (0.1704) (0.1620)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.2056∗∗∗ 0.1414 0.2175∗∗∗ -0.2783 0.2044∗∗∗ 0.1346 0.2164∗∗∗ -0.2785
(0.0267) (0.1014) (0.0255) (0.1864) (0.0265) (0.1007) (0.0254) (0.1871)
Ln GDPj,t−1 0.6167∗∗∗ 0.6371∗∗∗ 1.6049∗∗∗ 1.5614∗∗∗ 0.5655∗∗∗ 0.5830∗∗∗ 1.5211∗∗∗ 1.4865∗∗∗
(0.1129) (0.1073) (0.1455) (0.1427) (0.1183) (0.1129) (0.1428) (0.1407)
Trade opennessj,t−1 0.3600∗∗∗ 0.3741∗∗∗ 0.9315∗∗∗ 0.9049∗∗∗ 0.3490∗∗∗ 0.3634∗∗∗ 0.9139∗∗∗ 0.8896∗∗∗
(0.0912) (0.0925) (0.1011) (0.1001) (0.0882) (0.0879) (0.0974) (0.0967)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1178∗∗∗ 0.0555 0.1755∗∗∗ 0.1206∗∗∗ 0.1173∗∗∗ 0.0524 0.1763∗∗∗ 0.1209∗∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0408) (0.0425) (0.0442) (0.0356) (0.0392) (0.0412) (0.0430)
Ln productivityj,t−1 0.0196 0.2710 0.6613 0.8190∗ -0.0842 0.1468 0.4299 0.5964
(0.5484) (0.5456) (0.4474) (0.4410) (0.5182) (0.5127) (0.4412) (0.4350)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 0.0129 0.1087 0.0588 0.1611 0.2634 0.3527 0.2314 0.3245
(0.6223) (0.5920) (0.6089) (0.6004) (0.5915) (0.5499) (0.5867) (0.5758)
HCDij,t−1 -0.9895 -1.7054∗ 0.2990 -0.0398 -1.1331 -1.8124∗∗ -0.0916 -0.3689
(0.9527) (0.9159) (1.2344) (1.1792) (0.9418) (0.9034) (1.2924) (1.2312)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 0.7091∗ 0.5527∗ 1.9088∗∗∗ 1.7763∗∗∗ 0.7295∗ 0.5615∗ 1.9387∗∗∗ 1.8071∗∗∗
(0.3874) (0.3199) (0.4627) (0.4482) (0.3991) (0.3293) (0.4669) (0.4547)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.7644 0.7742 0.8330 0.8371 0.7656 0.7754 0.8345 0.8384
Observations 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of global FDI
regulatory restrictiveness index on cross-border investment and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results of sector-specific regulatory restrictiveness
of FDI. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 3: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Restrictive Measures on FDI Stocks:
OECD vs. Emerging countries
FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 -0.8966 -0.6555 -2.7090∗∗∗ -2.8372∗∗∗
(1.2328) (1.3337) (0.8676) (0.8605)
FDI RI Primaryj,t−1 3.6750∗∗ 2.4437 0.7382 1.9517
(1.8083) (2.1133) (1.6106) (1.6061)
FDI RI Secondaryj,t−1 3.1933 3.9684 2.4651 2.2995
(2.6091) (2.7213) (1.5354) (1.6283)
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t−1 -6.1587∗∗ -5.0693∗ -4.1793∗∗ -5.4537∗∗∗
(2.7217) (2.9055) (1.7590) (1.9009)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Global -0.4176 -0.9677 1.0522 1.8073
(2.6573) (2.6496) (1.6975) (1.9091)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Primary -1.5790 -0.1979 0.8708 -0.3874
(2.5561) (2.8042) (1.7777) (1.8106)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Secondary -2.9205 -3.3730 -2.3615 -1.9885
(3.3093) (3.2836) (2.5308) (2.6015)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Tertiary 2.5216 0.7075 0.5918 2.2627
(3.6011) (3.7849) (2.4709) (2.8830)
OECD dumj -0.3455 -0.5656 0.2383 1.6942∗∗∗ -0.3795 -0.6101 0.1558 1.4498∗∗∗
(0.4544) (0.4343) (0.2899) (0.5514) (0.4242) (0.4061) (0.3015) (0.5021)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.1768∗∗∗ 0.1169 0.2169∗∗∗ 0.1037∗∗ 0.1697∗∗∗ 0.1053 0.2132∗∗∗ 0.1031∗∗
(0.0634) (0.0731) (0.0449) (0.0482) (0.0645) (0.0747) (0.0430) (0.0457)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -1.9369∗∗∗ -1.9332∗∗∗ -1.0958∗∗∗ -1.1267∗∗∗ -1.9735∗∗∗ -1.9679∗∗∗ -1.1196∗∗∗ -1.1546∗∗∗
(0.2594) (0.2639) (0.1336) (0.1373) (0.2662) (0.2711) (0.1449) (0.1504)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.5249∗ -0.4980∗ -0.4240∗∗∗ -0.4442∗∗∗ -0.4977∗ -0.4692∗ -0.3903∗∗∗ -0.4130∗∗∗
(0.2757) (0.2754) (0.1497) (0.1512) (0.2833) (0.2834) (0.1444) (0.1456)
Common langij,t−1 0.5088∗ 0.5194∗ 0.3148∗∗ 0.2863∗ 0.5073∗ 0.5180∗ 0.3263∗∗ 0.3000∗∗
(0.2708) (0.2709) (0.1485) (0.1499) (0.2722) (0.2717) (0.1469) (0.1485)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.6041∗ 0.5745∗ 0.3702∗∗ 0.3773∗∗ 0.5405 0.5022 0.3104∗∗ 0.3199∗∗
(0.3408) (0.3441) (0.1551) (0.1575) (0.3492) (0.3526) (0.1485) (0.1534)
BITij,t−1 -0.6934∗∗∗ -0.7063∗∗∗ -0.3866∗∗ -0.3391∗ -0.7346∗∗∗ -0.7567∗∗∗ -0.5114∗∗∗ -0.4623∗∗
(0.1708) (0.1692) (0.1730) (0.1782) (0.1692) (0.1676) (0.1833) (0.1909)
RTAij,t−1 -0.6204∗∗ -0.6385∗∗ 0.3709∗∗∗ 0.3363∗∗ -0.6671∗∗ -0.6846∗∗∗ 0.3624∗∗ 0.3220∗∗
(0.2515) (0.2530) (0.1398) (0.1447) (0.2608) (0.2626) (0.1526) (0.1580)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.8362∗∗∗ 0.8386∗∗∗ 0.2004∗∗∗ -0.1195∗ 0.8210∗∗∗ 0.8242∗∗∗ 0.2028∗∗∗ -0.0990
(0.2577) (0.2558) (0.0300) (0.0702) (0.2589) (0.2558) (0.0302) (0.0698)
Ln GDPj,t−1 1.9802∗∗∗ 1.9635∗∗∗ 2.4362∗∗∗ 2.4201∗∗∗ 1.8389∗∗∗ 1.8193∗∗∗ 2.2892∗∗∗ 2.2802∗∗∗
(0.1802) (0.1778) (0.1315) (0.1279) (0.1735) (0.1706) (0.1277) (0.1284)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.1750∗∗∗ 1.1578∗∗∗ 1.4634∗∗∗ 1.4140∗∗∗ 1.1263∗∗∗ 1.1083∗∗∗ 1.4033∗∗∗ 1.3548∗∗∗
(0.1777) (0.1775) (0.1156) (0.1158) (0.1769) (0.1761) (0.1113) (0.1132)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1976∗∗ 0.2004∗∗ 0.1847∗∗∗ 0.1654∗∗ 0.1744∗∗ 0.1799∗∗ 0.1708∗∗∗ 0.1545∗∗
(0.0864) (0.0907) (0.0632) (0.0650) (0.0814) (0.0856) (0.0607) (0.0621)
Ln productivityj,t−1 -0.0406 -0.1748 0.2163∗∗∗ 0.7602∗∗∗ 0.0354 -0.1158 0.2344∗∗∗ 0.7258∗∗∗
(0.1155) (0.1360) (0.0730) (0.1843) (0.1133) (0.1430) (0.0720) (0.1713)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -0.9732 -1.0849 -0.3006 -0.1956 -0.4617 -0.5172 0.0377 0.1495
(0.8637) (0.8601) (0.6583) (0.6736) (0.8747) (0.8856) (0.6469) (0.6670)
HCDij,t−1 -6.6256∗∗∗ -6.8341∗∗∗ -1.0753 -0.4566 -6.7128∗∗∗ -6.9120∗∗∗ -1.2443 -0.6850
(1.0754) (1.0605) (1.1411) (1.1578) (1.1023) (1.0865) (1.1580) (1.1653)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 1.7859∗∗∗ 1.9592∗∗∗ 2.3610∗∗∗ 2.4041∗∗∗ 1.8480∗∗∗ 2.0308∗∗∗ 2.3490∗∗∗ 2.3783∗∗∗
(0.6236) (0.6439) (0.5189) (0.5323) (0.6469) (0.6710) (0.5195) (0.5384)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.5113 0.5213 0.7877 0.7993 0.5149 0.5254 0.7901 0.8015
Observations 19449 19449 19449 19449 19449 19449 19449 19449
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of global FDI regulatory
restrictiveness index on cross-border investment and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results of sector-specific regulatory restrictiveness of FDI. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 4: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Restrictive Measures on FDI Stocks:
OECD vs. Africa countries
FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 -2.5944 4.2008 -0.9225 -1.6162
(3.6069) (5.6213) (3.5504) (3.7637)
FDI RI Primaryj,t−1 2.1988 -15.8533 2.2433 3.2496
(6.4698) (19.2624) (4.1203) (4.0849)
FDI RI Secondaryj,t−1 18.9025 -61.7042 24.6712∗∗ 34.5852∗∗∗
(14.9815) (46.0373) (9.6302) (12.5787)
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t−1 -11.5606 34.9320 -13.7118∗∗ -20.7709∗∗
(9.9856) (26.9728) (6.6913) (9.0402)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Global 0.3457 -6.3800 -0.7046 -0.0712
(4.5099) (6.1340) (4.2073) (4.4800)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Primary 0.4262 19.0093 -0.4726 -1.5105
(6.9738) (19.3923) (4.2288) (4.2092)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Secondary -19.3509 62.0336 -25.3630∗∗∗ -34.9111∗∗∗
(14.8862) (46.4781) (9.7697) (12.8049)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Tertiary 7.1248 -40.4939 10.4122 17.1271∗
(10.2036) (27.3846) (7.0042) (9.6787)
OECD dumj 0.9745∗ -0.2000 1.1963∗∗ 1.9968∗ 0.6024 0.3135 0.6126 0.9346∗
(0.5710) (0.4262) (0.5064) (1.1026) (0.4660) (0.5090) (0.4326) (0.4899)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.1614∗∗ 0.0909 0.1970∗∗∗ 0.0983∗∗ 0.1471∗∗ 0.0609 0.1953∗∗∗ 0.0960∗∗
(0.0664) (0.0755) (0.0460) (0.0489) (0.0680) (0.0781) (0.0436) (0.0460)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -2.0158∗∗∗ -2.0291∗∗∗ -1.0735∗∗∗ -1.0968∗∗∗ -2.0293∗∗∗ -2.0688∗∗∗ -1.0890∗∗∗ -1.1107∗∗∗
(0.3097) (0.3126) (0.1492) (0.1550) (0.3105) (0.3099) (0.1630) (0.1723)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.3751 -0.3838 -0.3946∗∗ -0.4014∗∗ -0.3320 -0.3521 -0.3441∗∗ -0.3476∗∗
(0.2878) (0.2874) (0.1593) (0.1602) (0.2994) (0.2985) (0.1539) (0.1542)
Common langij,t−1 0.4299 0.4519 0.2730∗ 0.2564∗ 0.4255 0.4391 0.2751∗ 0.2567∗
(0.2751) (0.2764) (0.1535) (0.1530) (0.2757) (0.2754) (0.1509) (0.1510)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.5617 0.5116 0.3795∗∗ 0.3816∗∗ 0.4791 0.3929 0.3200∗∗ 0.3222∗∗
(0.3478) (0.3472) (0.1585) (0.1581) (0.3557) (0.3608) (0.1512) (0.1531)
RTAij,t−1 -1.0383∗∗∗ -1.0083∗∗∗ 0.4031∗∗ 0.3800∗∗ -1.0757∗∗∗ -1.0353∗∗∗ 0.4143∗∗ 0.3940∗∗
(0.3298) (0.3221) (0.1568) (0.1650) (0.3391) (0.3348) (0.1743) (0.1846)
BITij,t−1 -0.6872∗∗∗ -0.7202∗∗∗ -0.3623∗ -0.3486∗ -0.7402∗∗∗ -0.7920∗∗∗ -0.5241∗∗ -0.5198∗∗
(0.1853) (0.1858) (0.2012) (0.2064) (0.1824) (0.1838) (0.2171) (0.2239)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.7381∗∗∗ 0.8008∗∗∗ 0.2211∗∗∗ 0.1099 0.7229∗∗∗ 0.8408∗∗∗ 0.2225∗∗∗ 0.1055
(0.2615) (0.2094) (0.0310) (0.1160) (0.2605) (0.2208) (0.0307) (0.0978)
Ln GDPj,t−1 1.8161∗∗∗ 1.9712∗∗∗ 2.4428∗∗∗ 2.4123∗∗∗ 1.6377∗∗∗ 1.8315∗∗∗ 2.2595∗∗∗ 2.2303∗∗∗
(0.1725) (0.1715) (0.1431) (0.1469) (0.1690) (0.1787) (0.1434) (0.1461)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.0658∗∗∗ 1.2087∗∗∗ 1.4650∗∗∗ 1.4150∗∗∗ 1.0249∗∗∗ 1.2151∗∗∗ 1.3935∗∗∗ 1.3391∗∗∗
(0.1745) (0.1805) (0.1161) (0.1235) (0.1737) (0.1897) (0.1112) (0.1159)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1396 0.2267∗∗ 0.1623∗∗ 0.1628∗∗ 0.1320 0.2294∗∗ 0.1575∗∗ 0.1589∗∗
(0.0967) (0.1059) (0.0645) (0.0675) (0.0883) (0.0988) (0.0620) (0.0648)
Ln productivityj,t−1 0.5257∗∗ -0.5647 0.5537∗∗∗ 0.8370∗∗ 0.5485∗∗ -0.9420 0.5923∗∗∗ 0.8760∗∗∗
(0.2137) (0.5692) (0.1551) (0.3921) (0.2419) (0.7252) (0.1529) (0.3095)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -0.5215 -1.2559 -0.0989 -0.0404 -0.0899 -0.8208 0.1228 0.2298
(0.9023) (1.0013) (0.7090) (0.7608) (0.8914) (1.0320) (0.6879) (0.7243)
HCDij,t−1 -6.1623∗∗∗ -6.0969∗∗∗ -0.5337 -0.1014 -6.2865∗∗∗ -6.2358∗∗∗ -1.0182 -0.5708
(1.3752) (1.3453) (1.5348) (1.5285) (1.3563) (1.2903) (1.5545) (1.5509)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 1.7078∗∗∗ 1.9831∗∗∗ 2.5221∗∗∗ 2.6334∗∗∗ 1.8549∗∗∗ 2.2188∗∗∗ 2.5635∗∗∗ 2.6697∗∗∗
(0.6427) (0.6534) (0.5548) (0.5807) (0.6566) (0.6646) (0.5495) (0.5742)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.5173 0.5343 0.7955 0.8039 0.5221 0.5420 0.7982 0.8070
Observations 15213 15213 15213 15213 15213 15213 15213 15213
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of global FDI regulatory
restrictiveness index on cross-border investment and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results of sector-specific regulatory restrictiveness of FDI. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 5: Splitting the Time into Two Sub-Periods
2010-2014 2015-2019
OECD OECD vs OECD vs OECD OECD vs OECD vs
Emerging Africa Emerging Africa
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 -0.8035 -2.9042∗∗∗ 1.7913 -0.6455∗∗ -2.9875∗∗∗ -2.1790
(1.5949) (0.8700) (3.6596) (0.2530) (1.0427) (4.4139)
FDI RI Primary 0.3649 -0.7730 0.5863 0.4354∗∗ 2.4512 4.0204
(0.9116) (1.8619) (4.7161) (0.1771) (1.6878) (4.4847)
FDI RI Secondary -3.4786 4.7204∗∗ 31.1855∗∗ 0.2651 0.4153 32.8165∗∗
(2.3337) (1.8759) (14.1754) (0.3253) (1.8262) (13.2715)
FDI RI Tertiary 0.6948 - -4.4398∗∗ -13.7059 -1.2520∗∗∗ -4.8909∗∗ -18.3208∗
(2.1852) (2.0285) (10.3219) (0.2832) (2.1449) (10.0437)
OECD dumj∗
FDI RI Global 2.6453 -2.6827 1.4609 0.1616
(1.9471) (4.2966) (2.2472) (5.3016)
OECD dumj∗
FDI RI Primary 1.1214 -0.1415 -0.2583 -1.6392
(2.0444) (4.7030) (1.9557) (4.7076)
OECD dumj∗
FDI RI Secondary -7.9898∗∗∗ -35.0520∗∗ 1.2850 -31.6584∗∗
(2.9645) (14.3767) (2.7646) (13.5071)
OECD dumj∗
FDI RI Tertiary 5.5254∗ 14.6667 -0.2923 12.6691
(3.1115) (10.6817) (3.0882) (10.7487)
OECD dumj 1.4975∗∗∗ 1.2408∗∗ 1.0291∗ 0.7246 1.0888 0.5874 1.5750 0.3426
(0.4943) (0.4877) (0.5762) (0.4855) (1.2144) (0.9019) (1.5839) (0.6826)
R2 0.7646 0.7655 0.7672 0.7687 0.7740 0.7756 0.9522 0.9523 0.8324 0.8365 0.8436 0.8448
Observations 6161 6161 9355 9355 7568 7568 6230 6230 9445 9445 7645 7645
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) represent the results of restrictive measures’ impact
in the period 2010-2104 and the other columns indicate the effects in 2015-2019. For space reasons, the results of the other control variables are
omitted and the estimations include both country and time fixed effects . Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country-
pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% , 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 6: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Restrictive Measures on FDI Stocks:
OECD vs. BRICS and others Emerging Countries
BRICS countries Emerging excluding BRICS
FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 0.0643 -3.6988∗∗∗ 4.1624 -0.5836
(1.5592) (1.0036) (3.7510) (1.4247)
FDI RI Primaryj,t−1 1.8398 2.9083 0.9789 2.0527
(2.3826) (1.7918) (8.3325) (2.4692)
FDI RI Secondaryj,t−1 -1.3180 4.2798∗∗ 28.6969 8.8480
(2.9618) (1.9205) (21.3504) (8.0209)
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t−1 -0.5023 -8.7256∗∗∗ -7.2014∗∗ -5.6583
(4.5422) (2.6022) (3.6155) (3.5065)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Global -2.2348 2.5939 -6.3781 -1.0063
(2.7489) (1.9748) (3.9922) (2.3426)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Primary 0.2945 -1.3183 1.9154 -0.3630
(3.1266) (1.9792) (8.5453) (2.6292)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Secondary 2.6654 -4.0174 -28.6064 -8.8681
(3.8246) (2.8371) (21.1684) (8.3190)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Tertiary -4.6841 5.3995 2.0828 1.9990
(5.4679) (3.4629) (4.2043) (4.2348)
OECD dumj -1.5258∗∗∗ 1.1180∗ -1.2906∗∗∗ 0.6786 0.6778 2.7841∗∗∗ 0.4047 2.4006∗∗∗
(0.4154) (0.6439) (0.3991) (0.5045) (0.5587) (0.8244) (0.5338) (0.7038)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.0992 0.1003∗∗ 0.0871 0.0979∗∗ 0.0945 0.0955∗ 0.0761 0.0941∗∗
(0.0724) (0.0479) (0.0741) (0.0452) (0.0762) (0.0490) (0.0779) (0.0461)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -1.9008∗∗∗ -1.1124∗∗∗ -1.9283∗∗∗ -1.1421∗∗∗ -1.9148∗∗∗ -1.1058∗∗∗ -1.9452∗∗∗ -1.1328∗∗∗
(0.2753) (0.1413) (0.2816) (0.1543) (0.2918) (0.1519) (0.2962) (0.1683)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.4804∗ -0.4245∗∗∗ -0.4516 -0.3922∗∗∗ -0.4263 -0.4216∗∗∗ -0.3842 -0.3759∗∗
(0.2778) (0.1530) (0.2864) (0.1472) (0.2881) (0.1590) (0.2989) (0.1515)
Common langij,t−1 0.5240∗ 0.2685∗ 0.5160∗ 0.2867∗ 0.5071∗ 0.2776∗ 0.4996∗ 0.2779∗
(0.2721) (0.1515) (0.2718) (0.1507) (0.2843) (0.1528) (0.2852) (0.1511)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.5421 0.3781∗∗ 0.4658 0.3217∗∗ 0.5796 0.3791∗∗ 0.4821 0.3153∗∗
(0.3455) (0.1569) (0.3544) (0.1523) (0.3552) (0.1592) (0.3625) (0.1535)
RTAij,t−1 -0.6561∗∗ 0.3362∗∗ -0.7011∗∗∗ 0.3249∗∗ -0.7178∗∗ 0.3958∗∗ -0.7604∗∗∗ 0.3923∗∗
(0.2591) (0.1495) (0.2688) (0.1650) (0.2830) (0.1618) (0.2911) (0.1795)
BITij,t−1 -0.7016∗∗∗ -0.3301∗ -0.7481∗∗∗ -0.4597∗∗ -0.7425∗∗∗ -0.3570∗ -0.8080∗∗∗ -0.5139∗∗
(0.1722) (0.1831) (0.1699) (0.1978) (0.1825) (0.2012) (0.1809) (0.2204)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.8474∗∗∗ -0.0899 0.8368∗∗∗ -0.0771 0.7964∗∗∗ -0.1296 0.7860∗∗∗ -0.0814
(0.2334) (0.0837) (0.2319) (0.0794) (0.2658) (0.0933) (0.2514) (0.0885)
Ln GDPj,t−1 2.0854∗∗∗ 2.4323∗∗∗ 1.9580∗∗∗ 2.2805∗∗∗ 1.9212∗∗∗ 2.4128∗∗∗ 1.7696∗∗∗ 2.2578∗∗∗
(0.1824) (0.1325) (0.1820) (0.1338) (0.1766) (0.1402) (0.1713) (0.1418)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.2512∗∗∗ 1.4381∗∗∗ 1.2087∗∗∗ 1.3695∗∗∗ 1.1718∗∗∗ 1.4125∗∗∗ 1.1625∗∗∗ 1.3610∗∗∗
(0.1780) (0.1160) (0.1788) (0.1142) (0.1802) (0.1187) (0.1845) (0.1136)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.2356∗∗ 0.1869∗∗∗ 0.2121∗∗ 0.1733∗∗∗ 0.2152∗∗ 0.1597∗∗ 0.2188∗∗ 0.1599∗∗
(0.0957) (0.0673) (0.0914) (0.0647) (0.0967) (0.0661) (0.0924) (0.0637)
Ln productivityj,t−1 -0.5885∗∗∗ 0.6638∗∗∗ -0.5925∗∗ 0.6601∗∗∗ -0.5148 0.8445∗∗∗ -0.7243 0.7039∗∗
(0.2093) (0.2233) (0.2904) (0.1875) (0.3685) (0.3029) (0.4934) (0.2760)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -1.4698 -0.2544 -0.8940 0.1406 -1.0732 -0.0828 -0.6601 0.1601
(0.9033) (0.6799) (0.9463) (0.6715) (0.9222) (0.7308) (0.9579) (0.7126)
HCDij,t−1 -6.1903∗∗∗ -0.4411 -6.3859∗∗∗ -0.4920 -7.1014∗∗∗ 0.0522 -7.2965∗∗∗ -0.4484
(1.0716) (1.2010) (1.0858) (1.2232) (1.2259) (1.4662) (1.2285) (1.4856)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 2.0855∗∗∗ 2.5584∗∗∗ 2.1380∗∗∗ 2.5483∗∗∗ 2.1289∗∗∗ 2.6242∗∗∗ 2.3356∗∗∗ 2.6650∗∗∗
(0.6565) (0.5395) (0.6784) (0.5431) (0.6574) (0.5673) (0.6896) (0.5693)
Time− FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.5141 0.7938 0.5183 0.7967 0.5269 0.8041 0.5333 0.8065
Observations 16627 16627 16627 16627 16275 16275 16275 16275
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of FDI regulatory
restrictiveness index on cross-border investment between OECD and BRICS countries and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results on FDI among.
OECD and emerging excluding BRICS countries. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **,
*** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 7: OECD outward and inward FDI by service sector (% of service FDI)
Years 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Financial Inward 60.57 62.2 62.04 55.07 59.57
and insurance
activities Outward 65.44 65.71 66.87 65.19 68.25
Wholesale and retail Inward 11.89 11.49 13.79 12.57 13.6
trade repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles Outward 8.7 8.94 8.56 9.03 7.83
Transportation Inward 2.25 2.38 2.56 2.98 2.59
and storage Outward 1.58 1.52 1.59 1.88 1.77
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD FDI data
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Global financial sector Disaggregated financial sector
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Financialj,t−1 -0.5106 -0.2140 -0.0402 -0.0667
(1.4064) (1.4145) (1.5903) (1.5515)
FDI RI Bankingj,t−1 0.5432 0.2900 5.2978∗∗∗ 4.9846∗∗∗
(1.5084) (1.5149) (1.4446) (1.3903)
FDI RI Insurancej,t−1 1.3693 2.0304 -2.1418 -1.8860
(1.7819) (1.6664) (2.2261) (2.1842)
FDI RI Other f inancej,t−1 -1.9266∗ -1.8297∗ -5.8821∗∗∗ -5.6653∗∗∗
(1.1159) (1.0111) (1.4426) (1.3660)
FDI RI Business servicesj,t−1 -1.4061∗∗∗ -1.2451∗∗ -2.6909∗∗∗ -2.4932∗∗∗
(0.5220) (0.4949) (0.7163) (0.7058)
Ln FDIij,t−1 1.3941∗∗∗ 1.4429∗∗∗ 0.6669∗∗∗ 0.7428∗∗∗ 1.3746∗∗∗ 1.4238∗∗∗ 0.6155∗∗∗ 0.6797∗∗∗
(0.0608) (0.0632) (0.0623) (0.0641) (0.0586) (0.0621) (0.0600) (0.0639)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -0.7444∗∗∗ -0.6897∗∗∗ -0.7825∗∗∗ -0.7114∗∗∗ -0.7823∗∗∗ -0.7397∗∗∗ -0.8609∗∗∗ -0.8068∗∗∗
(0.1468) (0.1233) (0.1072) (0.1047) (0.1345) (0.1097) (0.1200) (0.1164)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.2543∗∗ -0.2626∗∗ -0.2819∗∗ -0.2707∗∗ -0.2109∗ -0.2232∗∗ -0.2030∗ -0.1996∗
(0.1187) (0.1056) (0.1141) (0.1092) (0.1173) (0.1038) (0.1157) (0.1130)
Common langij,t−1 0.1098 0.0793 0.1088 0.0989 0.1156 0.0793 0.1527 0.1380
(0.1180) (0.1115) (0.1109) (0.1049) (0.1161) (0.1081) (0.1127) (0.1082)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.0846 0.0752 0.2522∗∗ 0.2438∗∗ 0.0573 0.0475 0.1931∗ 0.1888∗
(0.1764) (0.1635) (0.1221) (0.1197) (0.1723) (0.1600) (0.1155) (0.1143)
RTAij,t−1 -0.4974∗∗∗ -0.4432∗∗∗ 0.1647 0.2137∗ -0.5291∗∗∗ -0.4747∗∗∗ 0.1311 0.1687
(0.1392) (0.1379) (0.1203) (0.1123) (0.1374) (0.1334) (0.1285) (0.1211)
BITij,t−1 -0.2043∗ -0.1899∗ -0.1643 -0.1503 -0.2381∗∗ -0.2342∗∗ -0.1655 -0.1598
(0.1124) (0.1064) (0.1534) (0.1454) (0.1001) (0.0946) (0.1860) (0.1775)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.2057∗∗∗ 0.1428 0.2177∗∗∗ -0.2773 0.2072∗∗∗ 0.1494 0.2162∗∗∗ -0.2623
(0.0267) (0.1017) (0.0255) (0.1867) (0.0275) (0.1064) (0.0256) (0.1843)
Ln GDPj,t−1 0.6205∗∗∗ 0.6434∗∗∗ 1.6250∗∗∗ 1.5791∗∗∗ 0.4719∗∗∗ 0.5214∗∗∗ 1.1968∗∗∗ 1.1815∗∗∗
(0.1141) (0.1095) (0.1431) (0.1399) (0.1046) (0.0984) (0.1268) (0.1252)
Trade opennessj,t−1 0.3725∗∗∗ 0.3866∗∗∗ 0.9617∗∗∗ 0.9320∗∗∗ 0.2868∗∗∗ 0.3086∗∗∗ 0.7429∗∗∗ 0.7265∗∗∗
(0.0917) (0.0938) (0.1005) (0.0988) (0.0861) (0.0876) (0.0924) (0.0916)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1148∗∗∗ 0.0529 0.1705∗∗∗ 0.1157∗∗∗ 0.0995∗∗∗ 0.0387 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.0610
(0.0361) (0.0403) (0.0425) (0.0443) (0.0368) (0.0397) (0.0378) (0.0405)
Ln productivityj,t−1 0.0505 0.2934 0.7395∗ 0.8965∗∗ 0.1869 0.4409 0.9066∗∗ 1.0488∗∗
(0.5397) (0.5372) (0.4165) (0.4096) (0.5504) (0.5389) (0.4369) (0.4262)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -0.0927 0.0213 -0.1190 -0.0018 -0.5972 -0.3109 -1.6285∗∗ -1.3788∗
(0.6541) (0.6232) (0.6335) (0.6250) (0.8737) (0.8334) (0.8286) (0.8336)
HCDij,t−1 -0.9563 -1.6821∗ 0.3661 0.0255 -1.0666 -1.8185∗∗ 0.2139 -0.1305
(0.9467) (0.9099) (1.2280) (1.1694) (0.9583) (0.9254) (1.3182) (1.2719)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 0.6489∗ 0.5062 1.8040∗∗∗ 1.6772∗∗∗ 0.8444∗ 0.6977∗ 1.8467∗∗∗ 1.7227∗∗∗
(0.3857) (0.3144) (0.4476) (0.4324) (0.4975) (0.4198) (0.5470) (0.5369)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.7643 0.7742 0.8326 0.8368 0.7663 0.7760 0.8398 0.8431
Observations 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391 12391
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of global financial
sector restrictiveness index on cross-border investment and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results of disaggregated financial sector. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10% 5% and
1% levels .
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Table 9: Exports of Primary and Manufacturing Goods from 2015-2019
Countries Years Primary commodities Manufactued
precious stones and goods
non-monetary gold
Africa 2015 5,68E+04 2,77E+04
Emerging 2015 1,32E+06 9,07E+05
Africa 2016 5,56E+04 2,77E+04
Emerging 2016 1,26E+06 8,46E+05
Africa 2017 6,58E+04 2,91E+04
Emerging 2017 1,48E+06 9,23E+05
Africa 2018 6,82E+04 3,19E+04
Emerging 2018 1,60E+06 9,89E+05
Africa 2019 6,57E+04 2,93E+04
Emerging 2019 1,49E+06 9,83E+05
Africa includes North and South African countries. Emerging countries include Central
and South Asia, Eastern and South-Eastern Asia and Latin America
Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD data
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Table 10: The Impact of FDI Restrictive Measures in the Agricultural and Manufactur-






Total Emerging countries BRICS countries
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Agriculturej,t−1 0.5197 0.8793 -0.1722 -0.6223 1.1153 1.9881∗∗ 0.2157 0.2306
(0.6648) (0.7391) (0.6100) (0.6176) (0.8349) (0.9649) (0.8271) (0.8243)
FDI RI Manu f acturingj,t−1 -1.7103 -0.9988 -2.5898∗ -2.7588∗∗ -3.4662 -1.5959 -4.8008∗∗∗ -4.8333∗∗∗
(1.9333) (2.0439) (1.3222) (1.3264) (2.3242) (2.2909) (1.5543) (1.6202)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Agriculture -0.9399 -1.4405 -1.2059 -0.5464 -1.4877 -2.9163∗ -1.5352 -1.3641
(1.3006) (1.3662) (0.9178) (0.9725) (1.4050) (1.5840) (1.0672) (1.0940)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Manu f acturing 3.5029 2.3922 2.9871 3.8300∗ 5.2172 2.6126 5.2991∗∗ 5.7823∗∗
(3.3960) (3.4249) (2.1544) (2.1974) (3.6057) (3.5207) (2.2957) (2.3892)
OECD dumj -0.3915 -0.5786∗ 0.5501∗∗ 2.1064∗∗∗ -0.4175 -1.6086∗∗∗ 0.1650 1.8455∗∗
(0.3540) (0.3421) (0.2419) (0.6114) (0.3527) (0.3982) (0.2385) (0.8667)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.1807∗∗∗ 0.1214 0.2175∗∗∗ 0.1026∗∗ 0.1667∗∗∗ 0.1039 0.2051∗∗∗ 0.1018∗∗
(0.0644) (0.0745) (0.0454) (0.0488) (0.0642) (0.0741) (0.0448) (0.0486)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -1.9593∗∗∗ -1.9546∗∗∗ -1.0663∗∗∗ -1.0953∗∗∗ -1.9180∗∗∗ -1.9208∗∗∗ -1.0580∗∗∗ -1.0837∗∗∗
(0.2646) (0.2688) (0.1383) (0.1402) (0.2732) (0.2790) (0.1407) (0.1436)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.5461∗ -0.5182∗ -0.4234∗∗∗ -0.4494∗∗∗ -0.5201∗ -0.5043∗ -0.4192∗∗∗ -0.4303∗∗∗
(0.2790) (0.2785) (0.1573) (0.1584) (0.2798) (0.2804) (0.1594) (0.1600)
Common langij,t−1 0.4760∗ 0.4889∗ 0.2905∗ 0.2638∗ 0.4652∗ 0.4938∗ 0.2723∗ 0.2433
(0.2802) (0.2805) (0.1536) (0.1542) (0.2799) (0.2811) (0.1547) (0.1556)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.6308∗ 0.6007∗ 0.4069∗∗∗ 0.4085∗∗∗ 0.6041∗ 0.5666 0.4019∗∗∗ 0.4067∗∗∗
(0.3474) (0.3506) (0.1514) (0.1527) (0.3505) (0.3526) (0.1521) (0.1525)
RTAij,t−1 -0.6103∗∗ -0.6306∗∗ 0.3817∗∗∗ 0.3511∗∗ -0.6441∗∗ -0.6491∗∗ 0.3780∗∗∗ 0.3439∗∗
(0.2523) (0.2540) (0.1413) (0.1468) (0.2610) (0.2613) (0.1451) (0.1510)
BITij,t−1 -0.6762∗∗∗ -0.6871∗∗∗ -0.3457∗∗ -0.3075∗ -0.6454∗∗∗ -0.6676∗∗∗ -0.3193∗ -0.2900∗
(0.1701) (0.1683) (0.1677) (0.1697) (0.1742) (0.1730) (0.1731) (0.1748)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.8340∗∗∗ 0.8367∗∗∗ 0.1939∗∗∗ -0.1300∗ 0.8303∗∗∗ 0.8507∗∗∗ 0.1815∗∗∗ -0.1137
(0.2573) (0.2553) (0.0291) (0.0734) (0.2566) (0.2322) (0.0278) (0.0980)
Ln GDPj,t−1 2.0384∗∗∗ 2.0145∗∗∗ 2.4175∗∗∗ 2.4056∗∗∗ 2.0629∗∗∗ 2.1486∗∗∗ 2.4730∗∗∗ 2.4147∗∗∗
(0.1861) (0.1830) (0.1287) (0.1278) (0.1882) (0.1893) (0.1322) (0.1320)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.2286∗∗∗ 1.2098∗∗∗ 1.4655∗∗∗ 1.4102∗∗∗ 1.2512∗∗∗ 1.3123∗∗∗ 1.5089∗∗∗ 1.4267∗∗∗
(0.1711) (0.1711) (0.1130) (0.1145) (0.1716) (0.1738) (0.1130) (0.1170)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1632∗ 0.1615∗ 0.1508∗∗ 0.1312∗∗ 0.1664∗ 0.1874∗∗ 0.1613∗∗ 0.1473∗∗
(0.0838) (0.0864) (0.0623) (0.0633) (0.0861) (0.0896) (0.0637) (0.0643)
Ln productivityj,t−1 -0.0913 -0.2436∗ 0.1941∗∗∗ 0.7953∗∗∗ -0.0796 -0.6819∗∗∗ 0.1623∗∗ 0.7530∗∗
(0.1144) (0.1456) (0.0744) (0.2137) (0.1176) (0.2179) (0.0797) (0.2998)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -1.3062 -1.4412 -0.5393 -0.3775 -1.3303 -1.8883∗ -0.5805 -0.3932
(0.9781) (0.9733) (0.6867) (0.7153) (0.9801) (1.0297) (0.6904) (0.7337)
HCDij,t−1 -6.6406∗∗∗ -6.8512∗∗∗ -1.1348 -0.4977 -6.0828∗∗∗ -6.2345∗∗∗ -1.2969 -0.7618
(1.0768) (1.0651) (1.1547) (1.1720) (1.0807) (1.0705) (1.2277) (1.2444)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 1.5927∗∗ 1.7265∗∗ 2.0407∗∗∗ 2.1382∗∗∗ 1.6244∗∗ 1.7586∗∗ 2.1515∗∗∗ 2.2519∗∗∗
(0.6547) (0.6774) (0.5275) (0.5319) (0.6616) (0.6903) (0.5357) (0.5386)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.5114 0.5213 0.7875 0.7991 0.4996 0.5144 0.7834 0.7935
Observations 19449 19449 19449 19449 16627 16627 16627 16627
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact on total emerging countries
and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results on BRICS countries Standard errors are reported respectively at the 10% in parentheses and clustered by country-
pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 11: The Impact of FDI Restrictive Measures in the Agriculuture and Mining






Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI RI Agriculturej,t−1 4.4306 -15.9606 6.7824 6.8618
(6.3253) (15.4882) (5.2212) (5.0804)
FDI RI Mining Quarryingj,t−1 -52.9798∗ 71.6922 -53.0927∗∗ -56.3174∗∗
(29.1565) (60.2865) (23.6493) (23.4842)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Agriculture -4.7502 15.4586 -8.0206 -8.1342
(6.4052) (15.4586) (5.2854) (5.1392)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Mining Quarrying 48.1582∗ -76.4974 51.4118∗∗ 54.7172∗∗
(29.0632) (60.0520) (23.5483) (23.4172)
OECD dumj 0.7574 -0.8539 0.9605∗∗ 1.6248∗
(0.5399) (0.6191) (0.4485) (0.9838)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.1508∗∗ 0.0772 0.1953∗∗∗ 0.0958∗∗
(0.0674) (0.0771) (0.0449) (0.0478)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -1.9904∗∗∗ -2.0189∗∗∗ -0.9990∗∗∗ -1.0245∗∗∗
(0.2999) (0.3024) (0.1539) (0.1596)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.3151 -0.3267 -0.3415∗∗ -0.3537∗∗
(0.2694) (0.2687) (0.1601) (0.1618)
Common langij,t−1 0.4399 0.4564∗ 0.2757∗ 0.2597∗
(0.2704) (0.2715) (0.1485) (0.1489)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.5229 0.4702 0.3969∗∗∗ 0.3983∗∗∗
(0.3518) (0.3523) (0.1455) (0.1458)
RTAij,t−1 -1.1363∗∗∗ -1.1015∗∗∗ 0.4250∗∗∗ 0.4031∗∗
(0.3677) (0.3591) (0.1649) (0.1738)
BITij,t−1 -0.6916∗∗∗ -0.7232∗∗∗ -0.3477∗ -0.3333∗
(0.1816) (0.1836) (0.1896) (0.1924)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.7136∗∗∗ 0.7984∗∗∗ 0.2226∗∗∗ 0.1268
(0.2589) (0.2105) (0.0311) (0.1059)
Ln GDPj,t−1 1.9473∗∗∗ 2.1159∗∗∗ 2.4856∗∗∗ 2.4634∗∗∗
(0.1782) (0.1731) (0.1535) (0.1594)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.1237∗∗∗ 1.2692∗∗∗ 1.4884∗∗∗ 1.4489∗∗∗
(0.1727) (0.1810) (0.1156) (0.1253)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.1141 0.1766∗ 0.1310∗∗ 0.1300∗∗
(0.0873) (0.0966) (0.0613) (0.0631)
Ln productivityj,t−1 0.4983∗∗ -0.6048 0.4996∗∗∗ 0.7315∗∗
(0.2014) (0.5201) (0.1597) (0.3582)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -0.4218 -1.1113 -0.2210 -0.2156
(0.9737) (1.0413) (0.7134) (0.7604)
HCDij,t−1 -6.0677∗∗∗ -5.9650∗∗∗ -0.3543 0.0549
(1.3539) (1.3248) (1.5101) (1.5138)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 2.0241∗∗∗ 2.2859∗∗∗ 2.4499∗∗∗ 2.5550∗∗∗
(0.7318) (0.7600) (0.5708) (0.5907)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.5211 0.5383 0.7967 0.8052
Observations 15213 15213 15213 15213
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Standard errors are reported respectively at the 10%
in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance, 5% and 1% levels
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Table 12: Gravity Estimation Results of Impacts of Restrictive Measures on FDI Stocks:
OECD vs. All emerging countries including Africa
FDI RI global Sectoral FDI RI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FDI RI Globalj,t−1 -1.1256 -0.9743 -2.9996∗∗∗ -2.9961∗∗∗
(1.2473) (1.3225) (0.8606) (0.8572)
FDI RI Primaryj,t−1 3.3042∗ 2.1786 0.0024 1.1242
(1.8542) (2.1177) (1.6079) (1.5991)
FDI RI Secondaryj,t−1 4.5390∗ 5.2919∗ 3.5005∗∗ 3.1564∗
(2.7509) (2.8590) (1.5584) (1.6280)
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t−1 -6.7533∗∗ -5.8418∗∗ -4.2562∗∗ -5.2182∗∗∗
(2.8166) (2.9723) (1.7295) (1.8172)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Global -0.3845 -0.7965 1.2851 1.7642
(2.6583) (2.6414) (1.6949) (1.8593)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Primary -1.1610 0.1110 1.6178 0.4286
(2.5509) (2.7796) (1.7773) (1.8011)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Secondary -4.3517 -4.7945 -3.5131 -2.8719
(3.4762) (3.4757) (2.5677) (2.5993)
OECD dumj ∗ FDI RI Tertiary 2.9679 1.3991 0.7142 1.8804
(3.6022) (3.7607) (2.4712) (2.7528)
OECD dumj -0.2421 -0.4509 0.2990 1.7348∗∗∗ -0.3226 -0.5497 0.1778 1.4397∗∗∗
(0.4680) (0.4486) (0.3004) (0.5517) (0.4281) (0.4119) (0.3083) (0.4985)
Ln FDIij,t−1 0.1954∗∗∗ 0.1366∗ 0.2163∗∗∗ 0.1035∗∗ 0.1868∗∗∗ 0.1236∗ 0.2113∗∗∗ 0.1020∗∗
(0.0636) (0.0730) (0.0447) (0.0481) (0.0648) (0.0748) (0.0428) (0.0456)
Ln distanceij,t−1 -1.9771∗∗∗ -1.9741∗∗∗ -1.1012∗∗∗ -1.1291∗∗∗ -2.0136∗∗∗ -2.0097∗∗∗ -1.1251∗∗∗ -1.1560∗∗∗
(0.2636) (0.2680) (0.1328) (0.1368) (0.2704) (0.2753) (0.1438) (0.1498)
Common borderij,t−1 -0.4961∗ -0.4713∗ -0.4307∗∗∗ -0.4493∗∗∗ -0.4683∗ -0.4430 -0.3969∗∗∗ -0.4154∗∗∗
(0.2731) (0.2728) (0.1490) (0.1505) (0.2808) (0.2811) (0.1441) (0.1450)
Common langij,t−1 0.4742∗ 0.4856∗ 0.3260∗∗ 0.3006∗∗ 0.4747∗ 0.4869∗ 0.3371∗∗ 0.3126∗∗
(0.2649) (0.2653) (0.1477) (0.1486) (0.2662) (0.2662) (0.1462) (0.1474)
Colonial linksij,t−1 0.6043∗ 0.5744∗ 0.3842∗∗ 0.3895∗∗ 0.5380 0.4997 0.3246∗∗ 0.3320∗∗
(0.3346) (0.3379) (0.1545) (0.1563) (0.3441) (0.3476) (0.1485) (0.1524)
RTAij,t−1 -0.6711∗∗∗ -0.6902∗∗∗ 0.3709∗∗∗ 0.3399∗∗ -0.7202∗∗∗ -0.7397∗∗∗ 0.3622∗∗ 0.3256∗∗
(0.2485) (0.2498) (0.1392) (0.1445) (0.2586) (0.2602) (0.1519) (0.1579)
BITij,t−1 -0.7235∗∗∗ -0.7344∗∗∗ -0.3811∗∗ -0.3403∗ -0.7611∗∗∗ -0.7801∗∗∗ -0.5056∗∗∗ -0.4657∗∗
(0.1672) (0.1657) (0.1716) (0.1762) (0.1659) (0.1645) (0.1816) (0.1883)
Ln GDPi,t−1 0.8493∗∗∗ 0.8505∗∗∗ 0.2065∗∗∗ -0.0635 0.8338∗∗∗ 0.8358∗∗∗ 0.2093∗∗∗ -0.0390
(0.2575) (0.2566) (0.0305) (0.0680) (0.2589) (0.2569) (0.0306) (0.0669)
Ln GDPj,t−1 1.9525∗∗∗ 1.9383∗∗∗ 2.4245∗∗∗ 2.4079∗∗∗ 1.8073∗∗∗ 1.7914∗∗∗ 2.2793∗∗∗ 2.2682∗∗∗
(0.1788) (0.1762) (0.1309) (0.1273) (0.1721) (0.1691) (0.1268) (0.1273)
Trade opennessj,t−1 1.1521∗∗∗ 1.1366∗∗∗ 1.4490∗∗∗ 1.3982∗∗∗ 1.1033∗∗∗ 1.0873∗∗∗ 1.3928∗∗∗ 1.3415∗∗∗
(0.1775) (0.1772) (0.1164) (0.1166) (0.1766) (0.1759) (0.1119) (0.1135)
Regulatory qualityj,t−1 0.2005∗∗ 0.1978∗∗ 0.1790∗∗∗ 0.1621∗∗ 0.1771∗∗ 0.1773∗∗ 0.1664∗∗∗ 0.1525∗∗
(0.0867) (0.0908) (0.0626) (0.0645) (0.0814) (0.0855) (0.0601) (0.0617)
Ln productivityj,t−1 0.0368 -0.0820 0.2615∗∗∗ 0.7824∗∗∗ 0.1217 -0.0155 0.2806∗∗∗ 0.7370∗∗∗
(0.1197) (0.1348) (0.0763) (0.1792) (0.1154) (0.1401) (0.0752) (0.1621)
Ln tax burdenj,t−1 -0.9246 -1.0305 -0.2375 -0.1279 -0.3930 -0.4514 0.0872 0.2146
(0.8583) (0.8586) (0.6579) (0.6719) (0.8710) (0.8866) (0.6451) (0.6649)
HCDij,t−1 -7.1570∗∗∗ -7.3917∗∗∗ -0.8946 -0.3179 -7.2453∗∗∗ -7.4677∗∗∗ -1.0193 -0.5228
(1.0189) (1.0036) (1.1099) (1.1202) (1.0396) (1.0243) (1.1249) (1.1260)
Ln Labor f reedomj,t−1 1.8006∗∗∗ 1.9630∗∗∗ 2.3156∗∗∗ 2.3632∗∗∗ 1.8708∗∗∗ 2.0389∗∗∗ 2.3132∗∗∗ 2.3505∗∗∗
(0.6231) (0.6433) (0.5164) (0.5304) (0.6430) (0.6668) (0.5148) (0.5338)
Time− FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Country− FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
R2 0.5190 0.5282 0.7932 0.8039 0.5228 0.5324 0.7956 0.8061
Observations 21566 21566 21566 21566 21566 21566 21566 21566
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks. Columns (1), (2), (3), (4) represent the results of the impact of global FDI regulatory
restrictiveness index on cross-border investment and (5), (6), (7), (8) the results of sector-specific regulatory restrictiveness of FDI. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and clustered by country- pair level. *, **, *** denote signicance respectively at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table A.1: Variable Description and Sources
Variables Description Source
FDIij,t Aggregate bilateral greeneld investments OECD.stat
RTAij,t Is a dummy that indicates whether both countries
have a trade agreement in force WTO (RTA-IS)
BITij,t Is a dummy that indicates whether both countries
have an investment agreement in force UNCTADinvestment
borderij Takes the value 1 when countries share
a common border, and 0 otherwise CEPII
langij Takes the value 1 when countries share
a common language CEPII
colonial linksij Takes the value 1 when two countries share
colonial links and 0 otherwise CEPII
Distanceij Distance in kilometers between country capitals CEPII
FDI RI Globalj,t Overall FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on all sectors in the host country OECD.stat
FDI RI Primaryj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on manufacturing sector in the host country OECD.stat
FDI RI Secondaryj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on secondary sector in the host country OECD.stat
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index of OECD
captures the level of restrictiveness in FDI on tertiary sector in the host country OECD.stat
GDPi,t Home country GDP (constant 2010 US) World Bank database
GDPj,t Host country GDP (constant 2010 US) World Bank database
Trade openessj,t Sum of destination country’s imports and exports normalized by GDP World Bank database
Regul qualityj,t Index that captures the ability of the government of the host
country to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations World Governance indicators
Productivityj,t Labour productivity measured by GDP per hour worked (U.S dollars) OECD.stat
Tax burdenj,t Measures the tax burden imposed by the government of host country Heritage Foundation
Labour f reedomj,t Index that measures the legal and regulatory framework
of a host country’s labour market Heritage Foundation
Educationj,t Index that measures the average years of schooling in host country Penn World database
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bilateral FDI
FDIij,t 21,960 7345.433 44071.73 0 1056271
Traditional variables of the gravity model
BITij,t 21,960 0.5297814 0.4991236 0 1
RTAij,t 21,960 0.6142077 0.486793 0 1
borderij 21,960 0.0441712 0.20548 0 1
langij 21,960 0.0619308 0.2410353 0 1
colonial linksij 21,960 0.0350638 0.1839452 0 1
Ln distanceij 21,960 3.613527 0.4664477 1.775372 4.29195
Ln GDPj,t 21,960 11.65486 0.6676412 10.1362 13.26245
Ln GDPi,t 21,960 10.85451 2.929926 1.011451 13.26245
Host country specific characteristics
Regul qualityj,t 21,960 0.9679318 0.739656 -1.074257 2.088636
FDI determinants in Host country
Productivityj,t 21,959 7476.289 15497.5 19.43301 59390.48
Tax burdenj,t 21,960 68.28214 12.28882 35.9 93.6
Labour f reedomj,t 21,960 62.14343 14.75172 21.7 98.5
Educationj,t 21,864 3.165414 0.4624206 1.750288 3.89154
Educationi,t 21,760 3.121759 0.5139138 1.750288 3.89154
Trade openessj,t 21,864 0.9518639 0.6097027 0.2248623 4.08362
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index
FDI RI Globalj,t 21,960 0.089699 0.0878699 0.004 0.435
FDI RI Primaryj,t 21,960 0.1192143 0.1168962 0 0.495
FDI RI Secondaryj,t 21,960 0.0403809 0.0612678 0 0.295
FDI RI Tertiaryj,t 21,960 0.1095849 0.1073558 0.007 0.506
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Table A.3: Cross-Correlation Table
Variables FDI BIT RTA border lang colonial Ln dis Product Tax Labour Regul Ln GDPj Ln GDPi FDI RI FDI Pri FDI Secon FDI Tert Educa Educa Trade
links tance ivity burden f reedom quality Global mary dary iary tioni tionj openess
FDI 1.000
BIT -0.039 1.000
RTA -0.015 0.290 1.000
border 0.110 0.096 0.105 1.000
lang 0.150 -0.097 -0.008 0.202 1.000
colonial links 0.105 0.006 -0.016 0.224 0.269 1.000
Ln distance -0.105 -0.428 -0.527 -0.393 -0.048 -0.088 1.000
Productivity -0.052 -0.059 -0.250 -0.044 -0.002 0.017 0.199 1.000
Tax burden -0.063 -0.070 -0.105 -0.056 -0.041 -0.015 0.142 0.320 1.000
Labor f reedom 0.068 -0.157 -0.159 -0.032 0.077 0.004 0.144 -0.130 0.017 1.000
Regulatory quality 0.069 0.018 0.162 0.051 0.034 -0.004 -0.137 -0.705 -0.339 0.296 1.000
Ln GDPj 0.124 -0.056 -0.237 0.019 0.069 0.053 0.173 0.047 -0.244 0.176 -0.044 1.000
Ln GDPi 0.002 -0.027 -0.108 -0.009 0.020 0.013 0.065 0.127 0.050 -0.034 -0.122 -0.015 1.000
FDI RI Overal -0.042 -0.166 -0.316 -0.076 0.018 -0.025 0.311 0.390 0.272 0.136 -0.391 0.227 0.073 1.000
FDI RI Primary -0.005 -0.146 -0.255 -0.077 0.021 -0.011 0.307 0.264 0.141 0.122 -0.288 0.277 0.054 0.886 1.000
FDI RI Secondary -0.040 -0.151 -0.241 -0.051 0.026 -0.028 0.254 0.192 0.160 0.226 -0.180 0.070 0.036 0.841 0.694 1.000
FDI RI Tertiary -0.052 -0.154 -0.332 -0.076 0.013 -0.025 0.298 0.469 0.341 0.100 -0.467 0.237 0.083 0.97 0 0.801 0.743 1.000
Educationi 0.112 0.024 0.128 0.066 0.021 -0.003 -0.180 0.181 0.066 -0.035 -0.155 0.014 -0.025 0.102 0.081 0.055 0.117 1.000
Educationj 0.082 0.035 0.045 0.082 -0.014 0.012 -0.147 -0.463 -0.223 0.354 0.665 0.028 -0.132 -0.326 -0.302 -0.119 -0.375 -0.127 1.000
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